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ABSTRACT

This article examines developments in the United States application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Substantial increases in international trade, due to an increase
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in participants that resulted from technological developments in transportation and
communication, has expanded the world market and the ability to trade between
borders. The U.S. is a major player in this expanding market; therefore, the myriad
of disputes that arise often involve the U.S. and as a result, it extends jurisdiction
extraterritorially. Thus, this Article discusses U.S. application of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction doctrine.
The U.S. policy and assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be attributed
to its desire to protect its nationals and to remain a major force in the world market.
This desire is the impetus that drives the coverage of this topic. The U.S. position in
the international arena is tied to the critical, sometimes blatant, role the U.S. assumes
by extending jurisdiction extraterritorially. The U.S. strong involvement in the world
economy and the prevalent use of extraterritorial jurisdiction has buttressed its
position as a major world power. Assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction covers a
broad range of conduct, which often occurs outside the U.S. borders and may have
substantial and direct effects on the economy.
This article is not all inclusive; rather, it evaluates trends in four pervasive areas.
Initially, a brief introduction and overview of early developments in extraterritorial
jurisdiction and U.S. policy are discussed. A look at the past is always helpful in
order to evaluate the present and possibly project future trends.' Next, the first trend,
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrines are reviewed. 2 Second, several U.S.
rules allowing assertions of jurisdiction, and other aids that may be interpreted as
jurisdictional in nature are discussed. This second trend is an analysis of whether the
use of certain rules by the U.S. unilaterally extends extraterritorial jurisdiction in untraditional forms. For example, the increase in the use of "most favored nation status"
policy or
allocations and sanctions encourage foreign countries to adhere to U.S.
3
incur the punitive effects that result if they are denied "MFN" status.
Next blocking statutes, which have been adopted by various countries, their possible impact on U.S. policy, and multilateral treaties are reviewed to show nations'
desires to harmonize 5rules in specific areas. 4 Also evidence of U.S. courts' judicial
restraint is discussed.
Finally, this Article concludes that even though the U.S. cooperates in harmonizing efforts, its policy is sometimes modified in an attempt to protect its
nationals and transplant U.S. economic, commercial, and political policy to other
nations.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See hifra notes
See hifra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

7-25 and accompanying text.
26-99 and accompanying text.
100-45 and accompanying text.
146-96 and accompanying text.
197-217 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The United States (U.S.) application of extraterritorial jurisdiction has expanded
very rapidly over the last several years.6 As a result, there is no definitive answer to
the query, what is the U.S. approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction? This Article, even
though not all inclusive, attempts to track the development of the U.S. approach, by
exploring a number of significant trends in the shift in U.S. policy.
After reading this Article, one will gain a working knowledge of the historical,
current, and possible future trends in the ever expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This paper will serve as a guide to the above query and allow one to predict which
acts are more likely to warrant an assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts.
Several avenues exist to establish whether U.S. courts may assert jurisdiction
over a certain matter. According to Justice Holmes, "The foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power."7
U.S. courts assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants using basically the same
principles applied to U.S. citizens. Many of the principles used to establish jurisdiction over foreign defendants are based on contacts set forth in InternationalShoe
v. Washington8 and its progeny. Shoe articulated the type and degree of contacts
necessary to establish jurisdiction and comply with due process? Thus, the minimum
contacts test adds a degree of predictability to the legal system, which in turn allows
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance of when
that conduct will or will not render them liable to suit,"0 in U.S. courts. Normally,
jurisdiction based on appearance, domicile or consent is met with little or no resistance. Physical presence in the state plus personal service" or certain acts or contacts
with the state 2 form additional bases for jurisdiction.

6.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1934) (amended 1996); see infra notes 11,43,55, 108 and accompanying text;
rIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (1980) (holding that jurisdiction also existed in respect to the trust's purchase
of eurodollar convertible debentures from a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of an American company; stating that
it should be evident by now that the presence or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in
other cases dealing with the question of federal jurisdiction in transnational securities cases is not necessarily
dispositive" in future cases .... but rather that the presence of both these factors points strongly toward applying
the anti-fraud provisions of our securities laws).
7.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (holding that a judgment invalid for want of service
amounting to due process is as ineffective in the state as it is outside of it).
8.
International Shoe Co... Washington, 326 J.s. 310 (1945) (holding that a court may assert jurisdiction
when a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a territory such that maintenance of the jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
9.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
10. See InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 (explaining fair notice based on contacts that warrant
assertion of jurisdiction).
11. See Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264,267 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating bases for asserting
jurisdiction if there is physical presence and service of process-general jurisdiction based on transitory presence
within territory).
12. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (finding certain acts or contact warrant
jurisdiction, purposeful availment and reasonableness in international cases. The court used the stream of commerce
analysis and held that jurisdiction did not comport with traditional notions of fair play).

1997/ United States Application Of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
Asahi Metal Ind. v. Superior Ct. of Cal.13 proposed that the federal interest in
foreign relations is best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the
assertion and the serious burden on the foreign defendant to defend a suit.' "Great
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisjurisdiction into the international field.' 5 The cornerstones to an international
'6 A
dictional analysis are purposeful availment and "reasonableness.'
State and federal statutes allow U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendants if the assertion is reasonably based on the foreigner's overt action, "purposeful availment." States' authority, through their "long arm statutes," has been
extended by the federal government; therefore, states may now use national contacts
in the jurisdiction equation to determine if jurisdiction exists.' 7
The U.S. asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction in several areas; nevertheless, much
of this article is prefaced around cases resulting from antitrust violations. Parts of the
tests formulated to settle antitrust disputes have been, on occasion, easily transferred
to other legal disputes involving the extraterritorial jurisdiction question, which
lacked specific mandates that cover that particular extraterritorial issue. The principles articulated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Assoc. 8 can be transferred to most extraterritorial jurisdictional analyses, and provide
the needed' predictability in this expanding area.
There are many approaches to the jurisdictional analysis, which usually comprise
combinations and extensions of traditional and nontraditional principles of jurisdiction. States have traditionally sought to assert jurisdiction on certain bases or
principles. As usually identified these include [but are not limited to]:
1. The Territorial Principle - A state may exercise jurisdiction with respect
to an act occurring in whole or in part in its territory.
2. The Nationality Principle - A state may exercise jurisdiction with
respect to its own national, wherever he may be.
3. The Protective Principle - A state may exercise jurisdiction with respect
to certain types of acts wherever, and by whomever, committed where
the conduct substantially affects certain vital state interests, such as its
security, its property or the integrity of its governmental process.

13. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
14. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 103.
15. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (citing United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 379 U.S. 378,404 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
16. Asahi,480 U.S. at 104, 115.
17. See Paulson Investment Co. v. Norbay Securities Inc., 603 F. Supp. 615,618 (D. Ore. 1984); see also
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,418 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the Lanham
Act possibly provided jurisdiction for alien defendant's foreign activity).
18. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Assoc., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter Tiniberlane I].
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4. The Universality Principles - A state may exercise jurisdiction with
respect to certain specific universally condemned crimes, principally
piracy, wherever and by whomever committed, without regard to the
connection of the conduct with that state.
5. The Passive Personality Principle - A state may exercise jurisdiction
with respect to any act committed outside its territory by a foreigner
which substantially affects the person or property of a citizen. 9
Early U.S. jurisdiction was confined to the territoriality principle.20 As the trade
of goods increased, as a result of globalization, the need to extend jurisdiction has
become more apparent.21 The Commerce Clause 22 of the Constitution provides a

vehicle by which the courts may assert jurisdiction for activity that directly "affects"
U.S. commerce.
Historically, U.S. courts have recognized that "[jintemational law is part of
United States law."'' As a result of trade expansion, protection of national interest,
and the effects of certain business activity on the U.S., extraterritoriality has been
extended to include the conduct of foreign nationals. Thus, U.S. law is applied to
adjudicate disputes that arise as a result of violations of that law or disputes between
private parties. The courts seem to view this as a natural extension since the U.S.
courts view international law as U.S. law.24 Moreover, in many instances, U.S. courts
do not differentiate between the scope of U.S. law and international law once the
court decides to assert jurisdiction. "One nation's assessment of its legal necessity

19. S. Houston Lay & Howard J. Taubenfeld, The Law Relating to The Activities of Man in Space (1970);
see also Don Wallace Jr., ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1099, 1099-1107 (1983)
(discussing three bases ofjurisdiction, territoriality, nationality, and security).
20. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241,279 (1808) (holding that all sovereignty is strictly local and cannot be
exercised beyond the territorial limits).
21. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Foreign Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994) (stating that it is the intention of Congress to apply the Sherman
Act extraterritorially); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b); Continental Grain Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 410 (8th Cir. 1974); AGE DISCRIMINATION INEMPLOYMENTr ACr, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621(1967) (amended 1996) [hereinafter, ADEA] (the ADEA applies to U.S. citizens employed in a foreign workplace by an employer. Section 623 (t)(1)
allows a "foreign law exception); Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447,
448 (1995) (providing that if an American corporation operating in a foreign country would have to "violate the
law" of that country in order to comply with the ADEA, the Act excuses such a corporation from complying with
ADEA).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (stating that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the states).
23. The Paquete Habana. The Lola., 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that international law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination).
24. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (1964) (Justice Harlan's noting that the
act of state doctrine has constitutional underpinnings); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co.,
494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that international law must give way when it conflicts with or is
superseded by federal statute).
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' The
often runs up against another nation's conception of its national sovereignty."25
U.S. courts assertions of jurisdiction often run afoul of other sovereigns' conception
of the U.S. jurisdictional limitations. Therefore, the necessity to assert jurisdiction
extraterritorially extends general principles of U.S. law to cover international
disputes affecting the U.S. This paper addresses the extension of several principles,
and highlights the overlapping and combined use of these principles by the U.S. to
establish and assert jurisdiction according to U.S. standards.

1H. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINES

A. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law where domestic courts
must refrain from asserting jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns; nevertheless, in
instances where propriety of asserting jurisdiction outweighs possibility of harmful
impact upon foreign relations, as articulated in the statute, the U.S. allows jurisdiction.26 "In the age of globalization, borders still count. Despite the growth of
global markets and international communications, the world is still made up of
sovereign, independent countries each with its own legal and political system."2 7
Therefore, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act2 8 and the act of state doctrine29
continually trigger a source of conflict and legal discussion. There is an inherent
overlap in the FSIA and the act of state doctrine. Both protect sovereigns from U.S.
jurisdiction. Both doctrines are outgrowths of the comity doctrine," which holds
sovereigns as equals.
Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one
hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation having due regard both to international duty and convenience

25. Kenneth Dam, Extraterritorialand Conflicts of Jurisdiction,77 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 370, 371
(1983) (discussing conflicts over expanding U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction and the use of sanctions); see also U.S.
CONsT. art. III (extending jurisdiction to U.S. courts for cases between citizens and foreign states).
26. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611, Pub. L. 94-583,90 Stat.
2892 (1982) [hereinafter FSIA] (allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts).
27. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, MAKNG GLOBAL DEALS:WHAT EVERY EXECUTIVE NEEDS TO KNOW AnoUr
NEGOTIATING ABROAD 103 (1991) (covering what every executive should know about negotiating abroad,
including dealing with foreign governments and laws).
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982) (outlining actions that allow U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction,
restrictive theory).
29. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US. 116,131-37 (1812) (discussing and adopting the absolute
and universal theory of sovereign immunity; sovereigns are equal. A sovereign has the duty, not to submit his rights
to the decision of a co-sovereign. He is the sole arbiter of his own rights).
30. Ilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining the doctrine by stating that comity, in the legal
sense, is neither amatter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor amere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its laws).
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and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
Thus, the U.S. recognizes sovereign acts and gives deference in several instances.3 2 Sovereign immunity for foreign sovereigns like the act of state doctrine
"has its roots, not in the Constitution, but in the notion of comity between independent sovereigns. ' Sovereign immunity result from the internationally accepted
territoriality principle, which allows sovereigns to respect mandates of other
sovereigns. "Sovereigns are equal. It is the duty of a sovereign, not to submit his
rights to the decision of a co-sovereign. He is the sole arbiter of his rights. He acknowledges no superior, but God alone, to his equals, he [is] shown respect, but not
submission."' The U.S. Constitution establishes standing for U.S. nationals to sue
foreign states, with the intention that "judicial power shall extend to all cases
...between a [s]tate, or the [c]itizens thereof, and of [fjoreign [s]tates, citizens or
[s]ubjects."3' 5
Sovereign immunity allows, within certain specified situations, the sovereign to
avoid U.S. jurisdiction. In Puente v. Spanish Nat. State,36 the court dismissed plaintiff's suit against the sovereign for recovery of monies due as a result of professional
services rendered. The Court denied plaintiff's motion to direct the clerk to enter
default judgment for the plaintiff. The Court stated that "it ha[d] no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim against a friendly foreign state." 37 More specifically, Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon38 recognized the balance between judiciary powers and the
executive powers in judicial matters that may affect foreign affairs. The Court said
the decision to revoke or limit the immunity of foreign states lay with the political
branch.39
Schooner4 involved an armed public vessel claimed by the French government.
Schooner adopted the absolute and universal immunity principle, and stated that
"[h]owever unjust a confiscation may be, a judicial condemnation closes the judicial
eye upon its enormity.... The simple fact in this case is, that an individual is
seeking, in the ordinary course of justice, redress against the act of a foreign
sovereign. But the rights of a foreign sovereign cannot be submitted to a judicial
tribunal."'

31. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
32. See e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (following the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity-activity was not commercial; the court declined jurisdiction).
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,438 (1964).
34. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 132 (1812) (concluding that sovereign immunity is
absolute).
35. U.S. CONST. art 3, § 2 cl.1.
36. Puente v. Spanish Nat'l State, 116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940).
37. Puente, 116 F.2d at 44.
38. Schooner, 11 U.S. at 116.
39. Puente, 116 F.2d at 90-9 1.
40. Schooner, 11 U.S. at 116.
41. Schooner, 11 U.S. at 132.
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This absolute theory reigned in the U.S. until 1976.42 The court continued with
this absolute theory, and said "[t]he immunity of an independent foreign sovereign
in our courts is well established."43 Molina v. Comision ReguladoraDel Mercado De
Henequen 4 involved an imperfect sovereign. The State of Yucatan tried to assert the
Sovereign immunity defense, but the court held that "the present suit is not against
the State of Yucatan, but against a business corporation in which that state may be
more or less interested." 45 In other words, the court said members of a federal union
do not fall within the sovereign immunity doctrine; the members make up the whole
and are represented by one recognized head. "[E]xcept in the case of immunity
arising from sovereignty, an action will lie against a foreign government not
completely sovereign. '"46 The court merely clarified that the sovereign is the whole,
not the parts.
The court in Schooner articulated why recognition of absolute immunity was
necessary.
[A] nation would justly be considered as violating its faith.., which should
suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a
manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized
world. This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being like the attribute
of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power,
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights
as its objects. The sovereign being in no respect amendable to another; and
being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only
under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging
to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.47
I

As international commerce increased, U.S. policy began to change.
The absolute theory of immunity continued to prevail in the U.S. even
though the Tate Letter 48laid the foundation for the adoption of the restrictive

42. See infra notes 46,49,51 and accompanying text.
43. Molina v. Comision Reguladora Del Mercado De Henequen, 91 N.J.L. 382, 386 (1918) (citing Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136-39 (1812)).
44. 91 N.J.L. 382.
45. Molina, 91 N.J.L. at 401.
46. Molina, 91 N.J.L. at 392.
47. Schooner, 11 U.S. at 137.
48. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, Letter from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to the Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 26 DEPT. ST. BULL., June 23,
1952, at 984-85 (outlining reasons why the U.S. should adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity to allow
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theory of sovereign immunity in 1952. In his letter, Tate highlighted reasons
why the Department felt restriction were necessary for sovereign acts that
were not traditionally performed by the sovereign. In his effort to justify the
change, Tate outlined the doctrine's history and discussed other countries
that applied the restrictive versus the absolute view of sovereign immunity.
Most importantly he said,
[T]he Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the
part of governments engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a
practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their
rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the
Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of
sovereign immunity. It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a
plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. There
have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme Court feel
that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the Government
charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.49
This letter, and the decision set forth in Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino0
led to the codification of the FSIA of 1976.5' The consensus was that the act of state
"preclude[d] the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of public acts
[that] a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory." 52 The
request to assert jurisdiction was premised on an alleged violation of international
law due to expropriation (of capital stocks). The Sabbatino Court said it would not
sit in judgment on the validity of a foreign act of state under foreign law, for such an
inquiry would not only be exceedingly difficult but, if wrongly made, would be
likely highly offensive to the State in question.5 3 Here the court re-examined the
concepts under international law, which are used to determine when a government
"taking" contravenes international law. Normally, if the taking is not for a public
purpose, i.e., if it is discriminatory or is without provision for prompt, adequate,
effective compensation, it is deemed improper. Nevertheless, the court held that the

persons doing business with sovereign to have their rights determined by the courts).
49. Id.
50. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding that the judicial branch will
not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreements).
51. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602- 1611, Pub. L .94-583,90 Stat. 2892 (1982).
52. Sabbatio, 376 U.S. at 400.
53. See Sabbathio, 376 U.S. at 415 n. 17.
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act of state doctrine was applicable even in the face of a violation of international
law. 4
The FSIA provides that foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are
immune from suit in U.S. courts unless the conduct complained of falls within
various specified exceptions set forth in the statute. These exceptions entail;
commercial activity and waiver by a sovereign, 5 property taken in violations of
international law, rights in property by succession or gift or right is in the U.S.; and
money damages for personal injury or death, or damages to or loss of property noncommercial tort 56
These exceptions are the sole bases for U.S. courts to assume jurisdiction over
foreign states; otherwise, they are immune. The presumption is that the sovereign is
immune from suit, unless he explicitly waives his right. Further, the FSIA outlines
service of process rules.57 In actions against foreign states, "the district court shall
have original [and] personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every
claim for relief... [and] an appearance by a foreign sovereign does not confer
person jurisdiction with respect to any claim not arising out of any transaction or
occurrence enumerated in Sections 1605-07 of this title."58 The FSIA merges
concepts of personal and subject matter jurisdiction so that the court has personal
jurisdiction in any case where the Act authorizes subject matter jurisdiction, so long
as both-proper service and the requisites of due process are satisfied.5 9 If a dispute
falls within the exceptions set forth in the statute, U.S. courts assume jurisdiction.
The commercial exception is continually a major point of contention under the FSIA
and the act of state doctrine.
For example when the Mexican government nationalized a privately owned
Mexican bank, plaintiffs (U.S. citizens) with certificates of deposits in this bank
sought relief. The exchange control regulations mandated that all deposits be repaid
in Mexican pesos; thus, the plaintiffs argued for the applicability of the commercial
activity exception? ° The court said two questions must be addressed to find com-

54. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 415 n.17; but see Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1976) (Hickenlooper Amendment) (providing that confiscation or taking in violation of international law is within
U.S. courts' jurisdiction.).
55. See hfra notes 57-72 and accompanying text (discussing several exceptions and the deference the U.S.
extends to sovereigns).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982); see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428 (1989); see alsoCarnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Oy Wartsila A.B., 159 B.R. 984 (1993) (holding that the Finnish
Corporation was a foreign state, 80% government owned, under FSIA-thus immune).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982); see FED. R. CIv. P. 4(j)(1) (1993).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(c).
59. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 607-14 (1992) (describing which sovereign
acts fall within statutory exceptions and warrant extending jurisdiction; when the sovereign acts, not as regulator
of a market, but in a manner of private player within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are commercial within the
meaning of the FSIA).
60. See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that court is barred from in-court
inquiry into validity of acts of foreign states performed in their own territory).
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mercial activity: Was the suit based upon a commercial activity by Bancomer?61 And
62
if so, did the commercial activity have the requisite nexus with the United States?
This court, unlike the District Court, held that the action was not based upon the
promulgation of a sovereign act by Mexico, but upon Bancomer's activities. Thus,
Bancomer was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA.63 The court held
that the act of state doctrine applied but that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did
not. The court also held that the case was based on commercial acts that directly
affected the United States, and that it implicated sovereign acts taken by Mexico to
reserve its foreign exchange reserves. 64
At first glance, these holdings may seem inconsistent, but they reflect an
underlying unity. Both the United States and Mexico had ties to the deposits and,
therefore, both countries possessed a common interest in the deposits. The interest
of the United States justified its exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA to hear
claims regarding a breach of the terms of the deposits.
Likewise, Mexico's interest justified its application of the exchange control
decrees. The court expressed no opinion as to which of the interests was greater, but
said the act of state doctrine reserved that question for the political branches. This
also reflects the view that, where competing sovereign interests are at stake, the
delicate task of resolving disputes is best handled through diplomatic channels. 65 The
Callejo 66 court, therefore, affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing the case.
This analysis is often followed by U.S. Courts.
More recently, in Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina,67 plaintiff's were
holders of registered bonds adversely affected when Argentina extended time of payment in an effort to stabilize its currency. In order to determine the applicability of
the commercial exception, the court looked to the nature rather than to the purpose
of the act. The court determined whether they were the type of actions by which a
private party engages in trade and traffic or commerce rather than whether the
foreign government is acting with a profit motive or with the aim of fulfilling
uniquely sovereign objectives. 6 The court concluded that Argentina's acts were commercial. Therefore, the court performed an analysis of the "direct effects"6 9 on the
U.S. economy. The court found Swe's minimum contacts requirement as well as the

61.

Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1126.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

66.

Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1101.

67.

See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).

68.

Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.

69. See id., 504 U.S. at 619 (holding that an effect is direct if it follows as an immediate consequence of the
defendant's activity).
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mandates for effects on U.S. commerce, which were set forth in Alcoa. Therefore,
the case fell within the scope of the FSIA.70
Interestingly, in this case one observes the court's recognition that Argentina's
acts were too attenuated to affect New York as a world financial center, but nonetheless the acts had a direct effect on the U.S. commerce as a whole. This observation
is analogous to the court's allowing the states to use national contacts to assert long
arm jurisdiction if the "minimum contacts" test is satisfied.
The sovereign may waive his immunity. 71 Special provisions may exist depending on the circumstances surrounding the waiver. Like the commercial exception, waiver by a sovereign is not always clear. U.S. courts have insisted that the
waiver be explicit, and not implied. For example, in Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Trust Co.,72 Iraq appeared to have waived its immunity by specially
appearing to oppose defendant's application to transfer jurisdiction to another court.
Defendant's motion was denied. The Court said that the waiver was not for all
purposes but operated only to subject the Republic of Iraq to the jurisdiction for
purposes of determining its claim against defendant. 73 On the contrary, in National
City Bank of New York v. Republic of China,74 the sovereign also waived its
immunity, yet moved to prevent the defendant's counterclaim. The Court denied
China's request, reasoning that such an action would allow China to recover and
deny the defendant relief; this would not serve the ends of justice.75 More recently,
when a foreign government did not respond substantively to any averments or pose
any defenses, the foreign sovereign's action did not constitute an implied waiver of
the sovereign immunity defense.76 These cases illustrate the deference U.S. courts
extend to sovereigns even in a waiver situation. By insisting that the waiver be
explicit, U.S. courts are exercising the utmost caution to avoid intruding on another
sovereign's rights. Many of these principles overlap, especially the FSIA and the act
of state doctrine.

70. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619; see also FSIA supra note 26.
71. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that
Iraq did not waive sovereign immunity with respect to proceedings in state court by appearing specially to oppose
jurisdictional transfer order).
72. First Nat'l Cit, 207 F. Supp. at 590.
73. Id.
74. Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, (1955) (holding that ifa foreign
government invokes our law, it cannot resist claims against it as a result of the action).
75. Nat'l City Bank, 348 U.S. at 361.
76. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438,443 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding
that the strong presumption must be overcome to rebut the independent status of foreign agencies).
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B. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine precludes American courts from inquiring into the
validity or legality of acts done by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.77
The act of state doctrine like the sovereign immunity doctrine is also rooted in
principles of international comity, and involves a balancing of U.S. interest in
providing a forum for injured parties against the interest in maintaining amicable
relations with other nations by respecting their sovereign acts. However, the balance
struck concerning each doctrine varies. 78 Historically, the U.S. courts recognized the
rights of sovereign nations. "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in79
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
Thus, the territoriality principle prevents U.S. courts from adjudicating actions that
are accomplished within the sovereign's territory. The act of state doctrine has been
developed primarily through case law, and unlike the FSIA has not been codified.
Nevertheless, there are at least five exceptions to the act of state doctrine:
Bernstein exception," Commercial exception, 81 International law or Treaty exception, 82 Hickenlooper exception, 3 and the Situs rule84 This is the general rule in
the U.S.; nonetheless, U.S. courts have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to
decide cases and controversies' properly presented to them. The act of state doctrine
does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass
foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdiction shall be deemed valid. This
rule became evident when the court deferred to the Mexican government because the
act was executed within Mexico! 6 This case illustrates the interplay between
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine.

77. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,401 (1964); see Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250,251-52 (1897) (setting forth requirements for exemption: the act must take place within sovereign's territory
and the act must be a bona fide government act).
78. Callejo v. Bancomer S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1125 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
80. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlansche-AmerikaascheStoomvaart-Mmaatshappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954)
(providing that if executive branch advises against applying AOS, the courts may decline jurisdiction).
81. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 282, 695 (1976) (discussing commercial
activity exception).
82. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984) (discussing exception when clear violations of international law).
83. Empresa Cubana Exportadora, Inc. v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing Hickenlooper Amendment, which requires U.S. courts to adjudicate sovereign's takings if speedy compensation is not
provided).
84. Enipresa Cubana, 652 F.2d at 231.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl.1.
86. See Callejo, 764F.2d at 1101 (explaining that the proper test for determining situs is where the incident
of the debt, as whole, place it).
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Actually, exceptions to the doctrine were implemented in order to protect U.S.
citizens who trade with sovereigns or their instrumentalities. Each doctrine covers
a specific area, which was a major point of contention for U.S. companies doing
business with foreign companies, sovereigns, or their instrumentalities.
The Bernstein exception, was alluded to as early as 1890 when the court, in In
Re Baize7 recognized the executive branch's authority to certify whether an individual
was a public minister. The alleged Consul General of Guatemala asserted that the
district court did not have jurisdiction based on his status. The court said, "we do not
assume to sit in judgment upon the decision of the executive in reference to the
public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister, and therefore have the
right to accept the certificate of the state department that a party is or is not a
priviledged person. .... 88
Even though this case dealt specifically with recognition of a person representing
a sovereign, the same logic is apparent in deciding when an "act" is recognized as a
result of the state's action. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction if the State Department certifies that it will not affect American Foreign policy.
This doctrine was specifically developed in Bernstein v. N.Y. NederlandscheAmerekaansche Stoomvaart-maatshappij."9 If the Department of State declares that
the act of state doctrine should not be applied, then deference must be afforded by
the courts.' "The history of the doctrine indicates that its function is not to effect
unquestioning judicial deference to the executive, but to achieve a result under which
diplomatic rather than judicial channels are used in the disposition of controversies
between sovereigns.' 9'
Second, the commercial exception espouses the view that as more sovereigns
engage in commercial activity, the concept of the act of state should not be extended
to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign
sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities.' The commercial exception
resulted from decisions by the courts which allowed sovereigns to escape jurisdiction

87. In Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890) (concluding that the court would not sit in judgment upon the decision
of the execution in reference to the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister and, therefore,
the court has a right to accept the certificate of the state department that a person is or is not a privileged person).
88. Baiz, 135 U.S. at 432. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I1 U.S. 116 (1812) (stating that immunity
of foreign state lay with political branch).
89. Bernstein v. N.Y. Nederlandsche-AmerkaanscheStoomvaart-Mmaatshappj, 210 F.2d 375,375-76 (2d
Cir. 1954) (per curiam), nodified, 173 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1949).
90. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,764 (1972).
91. Robert Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-JudicialDeference or Abstention? 66 AM. J. INT'L. 83, 83
(1972).
92. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(realizing the exception set forth in the FSIA); see also Victor Friedman & Leslie Blau, Formulatinga Commercial
Exception to The Act of State Doctrine,Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST. JOHNS L. RrEV.
666, 678-79 (1976) (stating that "Dunhill case probably did not present the best possible factual setting for the
development of the Commercial exception"); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)
(holding that judicial branch will not examine sovereign takings when executed within its own territory).
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even though they were not executing acts associated with their sovereignty. Thus the
state department concluded that in the commercial area, the need for merchants to
have their rights determined in court outweighs any injury to foreign policy.93
Third, the international law or treaty exception does not prescribe use of the
doctrine of act of state nor does it forbid application of the doctrine even if the act of
state in question was a violation of international law. If an act violates international
law or treaty, the act of state does not apply.' If the sovereign breaches international
law, then the U.S. courts do not allow the sovereign to escape jurisdiction. 95
Fourth, the Hickenlooper Amendment6 gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over confiscations or "takings" by sovereigns in violation of international law, with two
exceptions:
(1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days
duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other
taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that
application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by
the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this
effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court. 97
Therefore, U.S. courts allow plaintiffs to pursue actions as a result of illegal
takings. Sovereigns can not assert sovereign immunity when the act complained of
is clearly beyond its scope as a sovereign. This exception allows the court to pierce
the sovereign's veil and allows the aggrieved to have his day in court.
Last, the situs exception allows courts to refuse to give effect to foreign acts of
state that affect property whose situs is in the U.S. Courts give effect to acts under
the act of state only insofar as they come to complete fruition within the sovereign's
territory, foreign country. Under the act of State doctrine, when a foreign government
performs an act of state which is an accomplished act, that is, when it has parties and

93. Dunhill,425 U.S. at 706.
94. See Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 398; Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422,425 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Act of State doctrine did not preclude court
from adjudicating American corporation's claim against Ethiopian government based on its expropriation of
corporation's interest, in light of the standards set out in the treaty between U.S. and Ethiopia, which only allows
two types of taking; property to be taken for a public purpose or property taken must be with just and expedient
compensation); Faysound Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp. & Waiter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 940 F.2d 399, 341 (8th Cir.
1991) (rejecting the Act-of-State defense).
95. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422,
425-26 (6th Cir. 1984).
96. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e)(2), as amended 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2) (1976)
(Hickenlooper Amendment).
97. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957,961 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
affirmed383 F.2d 166, 171 (1966).
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res before it and acts in such a manner as to change relationship between parties
touching the res, it would be an affront to such foreign government for courts of the
United States to hold that such act was a nullity.9'
The jurisprudential foundation for the act of state doctrine has undergone some
evolution over the years. The U.S. once viewed the doctrine as "an expression of
international law, vesting upon 'the highest consideration' of international comity
and expediency.
We have more recently described it, however, as a consequence of domestic
separation of powers, reflecting the strong sense of the judicial branch that its
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder
the conduct of foreign affairs." 99 Nevertheless, these exceptions send a clear message
to sovereigns engaging in international trade, by highlighting instances that will
subject sovereigns to U.S. jurisdiction.
III. EXTENSION OF U.S. LAW AND OTHER METHODS USED To
EFFECT POLICY COMPLIANCE

A. Extension of U.S. Law
The "pull and drag" of economic and political issues force the U.S. to expand its
jurisdictional span beyond the traditionally recognized areas. The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to "regulate commerce with foreign nations"' ° and gives
[C]ongress the power "to promote the [pirogress of [s]cience and useful [a]cts, by
securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthor's [a]nd [i]nventors the [e]xclusive rights to
their respective [o]rigins and [d]iscoveries." ' O' Additionally, The Trade Act of
1974,102 and The Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act of 1988103 provide the
U.S. Trade Representative with the authority to protect U.S. commerce from various
unfair trade practices, which affect U.S. commerce. The unilateral trade retaliation
provision was originally introduced as part of the Trade Act of 1974 to fight against
"unfair" foreign trade practices. 0 4
If the U.S. Trade Representative determines that an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country... violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise

98. Tabacelera v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706,715 (5th Cir. 1968).
99. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonic Corporation, Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,404 (1990) (citing
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398,423(1964)).
3.
100. U.S.CoNsT. art. 1,§8, cl.
101. Id
102. The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 tit. Ill, § 302, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975) (codified 19 U.S.C.S.
24112 (1979), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988)) (providing that the U.S. Trade Representative has the authority to suspend
trade benefits and impose duties).
103. The Omnibus Trade And Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
Toward Protectonism Under§ 301 of the 1974 TradeAct: Programsof Unilateral
104. Fusua Nara, A Shift
Trade Retaliation UnderhternationalLaw, 19 HoFsTRA L. REV. 229, 230 (1990).
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denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or. . . . is
unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce; the Trade Representative shall take action authorized and subject to the specific direction, if any, of
the President, regarding any such action, and shall take all other appropriate and
feasible action within the power of the President that the President may direct the
Trade Representative to take.... to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination
of such act, policy, or practice."' 05
This somewhat unfettered power given to the United States Trade Representative
has been highly criticized. The U.S. is increasingly exercising its "§ 301 power," and
has used it in numerous instances against several major trading partners, but not
without reprisals.'06
The Sherman Act' 0 7 allows U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over activity in
restraint of trade. In American Banana v. United FruitCo.,'08 the restraint of trade
question was pivotal. Even though the Court alluded to the possibility that U.S.
jurisdiction may extend to conduct in other nations, it nevertheless held to the
territoriality principle, i.e., that the activity was beyond the scope of U.S. jurisdiction.
This case involved an elaborate scheme to prevent competition and control the
banana market by purchasing competitors businesses, regulating amount of purchase,
and setting prices. The acts were done outside the U.S. territory but within the
territories of other sovereigns (Panama, Columbia, and Costa Rica). The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to extend jurisdiction outside the U.S.'0 9
Specifically, the Court said "[giving to this complaint ever reasonable latitude of
interpretation we are of the opinion that it alleges no case under the Act of
1111l
Congress....
This view has gone through tremendous change. In 1945, the Court developed
the "intended effects" test and extended U.S. jurisdiction to include action occurring
outside the U.S. but manifesting effects within."' UnitedStates v. Aluminum Co. of
America' 2 dealt with conduct abroad that substantially and foreseeably "effected"

105. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(b)(i),(ii) (1988).
106. Nara, supra note 104 at 230; LAWRENcE CoLuiNs, BLOCKING AND CLAWBACK STATUTES, THE UNITED
KINGDOM APPROACH452 (1986).

107. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)).
108. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
109. American Banana,213 U.S. at 354-55 (explaining that the "intended effects" test is a legitimate basis

ofjurisdiction to regulate economic conduct abroad when the defendant intends market effects, which in fact must
occur, result in substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or foreign commerce).
110. Anerican Banana, 213 U.S. at 359.
111. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,416 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining
that the intended effects test is a legitimate basis of jurisdiction to regulate economic conduct abroad when the
defendant intends market effects, which result in substantial, direct and foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or
foreign commerce and must occur in fact); see also Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1287
(3d Cir. 1979) (iterating the "substantial effects" test and reliance on matters of foreign policy, reciprocity, and
limitations ofjudicial power).
112. Alcoa, 148F.2d at 416.
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U.S. commerce. Specifically, aluminum producers were price fixing, intending to
affect the U.S. market. Contrary to American Banana,the Court here asserted that
Act) over foreign defendants whose conduct has
courts have jurisdiction (Sherman
"effects" on U.S. commerce." 3
As a first step in its efforts to ascertain if jurisdiction exists, U.S. courts balance
the comity principles. In other words, "this comity analysis is a balancing process to
determine whether the interests of the United States are sufficiently strong, when
balanced against those of other nations involved, to justify the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction."".4 The Court, in a later decision, extended Alcoa by eliminating
the need to prove intent. The Court said the mere existence of a conspiracy provides
sufficient evidence that the foreign actor intended to affect U.S. Commerce.1 s
In the seminal case on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court adopted the tripartite
test, "rule of reason, 1 . 6 to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction in actions dealing
with antitrust violations.
[T]he antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be some effectactual or intended-on American foreign Commerce before the Federal
Courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those
statutes. Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary
to demonstrate that the-effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable
injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws.
Third,.. whether the interest of, and links, to the United States-including
the magnitude of the effect on American foreign Commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis17those of other nations to justify, an assertion of
extraterritorial authority.
The court concluded that in order to determine the third part of the test, several
elements must be examined. These include the degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties, and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations; the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States compared with those elsewhere; the extent to which an intent exist to
purposely harm or affect American commerce; the foreseeability of such effect, and
the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct with conduct abroad."1
This analysis allows a court to identify the potential degree of conflict with another

113. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430,448.
114. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F.Supp. 1161, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
115. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. 328 F. Supp. 709,711-12 (D.C. Cir.) (1971).
116. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (Timberlane 1), 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976); see
also RESTATEmENr (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 401,403(1) (1987) (providing that nation with basis
for jurisdiction should exercise restraint when such exercise is unreasonable).
117. Timberlane 1,549 F.2d at 613.
118. Id.
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sovereign. These questions are frequently analyzed by U.S. courts to avoid encroaching on other sovereign's authority.
Ultimately, courts in the U.S. should refuse to assert jurisdiction unless there is
a cognizable "effect" on U.S. commerce in that particular instance. In addition to
"effects," U.S. courts look to the "limitations customarily observed by nations upon
the exercise of their power, limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by
the Conflicts of Laws.""1 9 These situations and criteria highlight the case by case
approach used by U.S. courts to determine the degree of conflict and the practicability of asserting jurisdiction. This method has been criticized, and rightly so,
because different circuits view certain factors differently. The outcome is, therefore,
difficult to predict despite the availability of criteria to decide such issues.
In 1984, the court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America NationalTrust
And Savings1 20 (Timberlane 11) used the tripartite test set forth in Timberlane I and
denied an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This denial was specifically based
on the third part of the test. In order to ascertain whether it should assert jurisdiction,
the court looked closely at this question: "As a matter of international comity and
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to
fairness, should
' 2'
it."
cover
The court went through an in-depth analysis of the seven factors articulated in
Timberlane I and concluded that the undisputed facts required a non-assertion of
jurisdiction. Of the seven factors, factors one and five weighed against asserting
jurisdiction. Specifically, the court said factor number one-the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy-was alone enough to decline jurisdiction. Likewise, the
court said factor five-the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
U.S. commerce-was not pervasive because the defendant's efforts were consistent
with Honduran customs and practices.
If strictly followed, this analysis would restrict U.S. assertions of jurisdiction to
cases which blatantly infringe on U.S. law and policy. In Timberlane II, "the
potential for conflict with Honduran policy was great; the effect on U.S. commerce
was minimal and the majority of the conduct and impact thereof took place in
Honduras."' Thus, in Timberlane 1 the court refused to assert jurisdiction based on
Timberlane I's comity analysis, part three of the test.
The deference afforded Honduras must be adopted by the U.S. to provide more
predictability in this area. Limiting assertions of jurisdiction to violations noted as
strictly blatant breaches of widely accepted international law would more than likely
gain international approval. This limitation would allow for predictability, and foster

119. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
749 F.2d 1378, 1383120. T'mberaneLumber Co.v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. (Tintberlane 11),
86 (9th Cir. 1984); see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (considering
factors of comity, foreign policy and limitation of judicial power).
121. Timberlane 11,749 F.2d at 1378.
122. Id. at 1386.
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cooperation with and facilitate respect among nations. Adhering to established international policy and refusing to assert jurisdiction if the issue is outside customarily
prescribed international policy is a trend the U.S. must employ on a consistent basis
to avoid retaliation.
Unfortunately, U.S. assertion of jurisdiction is often viewed as a blatant disregard, at times, for foreign sovereign's sovereignty. In a tax case, the defendant
argued that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) does not allow
worldwide inspection of foreign corporations based on the agency's administrative
summons authority. The U.S. Tax Court, nevertheless, extended U.S. jurisdiction by
allowing the Internal Revenue Service to audit portions of bank records, in Hong
Kong, used to calculate worldwide gross income. The court realized that comity and
international law should be considered, but said the TEFRA supplements the Commissioner's administrative power to cover those situations where a procedure is
necessary to ensure timely production of documents held abroad.123 The TEFRA
clearly fell outside U.S. borders and the impact on U.S. commerce seems de minimis.
zeal, protectionistic, and imperialistic approach to
This case illustrates the U.S.
124
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
B. OtherMethods Used To Effect Policy Compliance
Most U.S. foreign policy and jurisdiction have economic overtones. Many years
prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement, t2 an economic issue developed
between the U.S. and Mexico and had a great impact on U.S. Mexican relations. At
the beginning of the 1970's, the United States experienced its first postwar economic
crisis. Among the measures to counteract the crisis,.. a special import duty [was
imposed] which seriously affected Mexican exports. The Mexican government
decided to regulate foreign investment, particularly targeting U.S. firms; and the
United States, for its part, multiplied non-tariff restrictions on Mexican products.
Migratory workers became viewed as a problem in the United States, and the issue
took on political overtones and became an instrument of
of drug trafficking
26
pressure."'

123. The Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 701 (1985).
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78J(b) (jurisdiction may be found even in the
absence of domestic impact or domestic securities or plaintiff); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (allowing foreign
plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
sanctions); supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing limitations customarily observed by nations upon
the exercise of their power; nevertheless, the court concluded that U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign
defendants whose conduct has "effects" on U.S. commerce).
125. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1106(l)(c), 32 I.L.M. 289, Dec. 17, 1992 [hereinafter
NAFTA] (stating that "A party may not require another party to purchase, use, or give better treatment to goods
or services provided by producers in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from individuals in its territory").
126. GUADALUPE GoNzALES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MExico's FOREIGN POLICY: OLD ATrrrUDEs AND NEW
REALrmES, reprinted in FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S.-MExIco RELATIONS 21,22-33 (Rosario Green & Peter H. Smith,
eds. 1989) (papers prepared for the Bilateral Committee on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, Pub-
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The approach used against Mexico in the 1970's was the precursor to U.S. conduct today, in the area of retaliatory measures used to implement U.S. policy or to
protect the U.S. economy. The U.S. uses a number of methods to influence its policy
decisions: Threats of unilateral sanctions; allocations of most favored nation status
to non-GATT countries, removal or threats of removal of said sanctions, trade
regulations that adversely affect the countries they are directed toward and executive
branch intervention, among other things.
The General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, 27 imposes a duty on all parties
to afford any reduction in tariffs to all others. The most favored nation 2 1 (hereinafter
MFN) principles impose a duty on all parties to the GATT to treat all parties equally
regarding tariffs and duties, any reduction given to one must be afforded all others.
Non-GATT parties also seek this status to obtain preferential treatment. The U.S.
often threatens to suspend MFN status if the country does not adhere to U.S. policy.
The U.S. threatens and imposes sanctions on many countries in order to impose
U.S. domestic and foreign policy, trade and political views. The conflicts in Poland
in the 1980's (Poland sanction cases) and the U.S. unilateral attempt to prevent a
French country from trading with China,129 are examples of the U.S. use of threats
to alter conduct. The U.S. also threatened the Japanese semiconductor industry with
an investigation of trade violations. As a result, Japan agreed to increase market
shares.' 30
These instances represent and illustrate U.S. attempts to discourage activity that
is contrary to its policy. The U.S. has several statutes which specifically allow the
U.S. to sanction sovereigns in order to encourage compliance with U.S. policy.
The Export Administration Act 3 ' and § 301 of The Trade Act of 1988, 132 sets
forth mandatory action that must be taken by the U.S. Trade Representative in cases
that deal with barriers and restrictions to U.S. trade and allows sanctions purportedly
in the interest of national security and foreign policy concerns. Prior to 1988, the
President had authority, among other things, to impose duties or export restrictions

lished by: Center for U.S-Mex. Studies, Univ. of Cal. San Diego).
127. General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 194 Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3 [hereinafter GATT]; see hifra notes 133, 152 and accompanying text (discussing "MFN" status and
sanctions).
128. See GATT, supranote 127.
129. See Dam, supra note 25, at 374 (discussing Poland sanction cases, including limitations on export of
U.S. oil and gas equipment and technology transfer to the U.S.S.R.); see also infra notes 132-33 and accompanying
text (discussing U.S. Trade Representative's authority to use sanctions against countries that are engaged in unfair
trade practices).
130. See Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonablenessin Int'l Trade: Section 301 of The Trade Act of 1984,
96YALELJ. 1122,1142-43, n.100 (1987) (explaining the conflict between U.S. and Japan about the unreasonable
restrictions on U.S. semiconductor manufacturers and the lack of a reciprocal market share for U.S. manufacturers
in relationship to § 301 provisions).
131. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C., app. §§ 2401-20 (1982 & Supp. IV, 1986); see Omnibus Trade
and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301-02, 102 Stat. 1164 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988)
or "Super 301") [hereinafter Trade Act of 1988].
132. Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20.
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on the goods of such
foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he deter133
mined appropriate.
Presently, the United States Trade Representative holds the authority to threaten,
and impose trade sanctions against countries that engage in certain unfair international trade practices. 34 Additionally, the U.S. "use[s] § 301 against practices that
do not violate any international agreements, principally when a foreign country increases its level of protection, when it takes inappropriate advantage of loopholes or
ambiguities in existing trade agreements, or when [as with many developing countries] it maintains a high level of protection relative to the United States yet is the
beneficiary of import trade preferences."' 35
The United States has increasingly resorted to economic sanctions as a major tool
to influence its foreign policy. Recent targets include Panama, South Africa,
Nicaragua, Libya, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Iran. 136 As conflicts develop around
the world, the U.S. finds it harder to resist the temptation to step in as an intermediary, whether invited or not. 37
This paper discusses a few of the measures used to bring about compliance. "The
spectrum ranges from... covert actions, to economic sanctions, and finally to
diplomatic measures, such as expulsion of some of the target countries' diplomatic
personnel, recall of the ambassador, or suspension of cultural exchanges.' ' 38 Even
though the spectrum is broad, the U.S. usually threatens and sanctions other countries
for certain activity.
The unilateral use of sanctions as a tool by the U.S. to enforce its policy is39
growing rapidly. The U.S. already regulates trade more often than most nations.
The Export Act creates a new category of U.S. sanctions against non-U.S. firms
committing no violations of U.S. law. This Act was designed to circumvent possible
adversarial use that would impede national security and foreign policy. "The United
States has in recent years made considerable use of trade sanctions as a foreign policy

133. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (providing authority to the U.S. Trade Representative to
sanction sovereigns that restrict U.S. trade).
134. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
135. Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Universal Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limit Case
for Sec 301, 23 LAw & POL'Y INT'LBus,263,263 (1992); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
136. Barry E. Carter, Intenrational Economic Sanctions: Improving The Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75
CAU. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1987).
137. See supra notes 21, 25 & 96 and accompanying text; Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (requiring
the U.S. Trade Representative to identify and analyze acts, policies or practices of each foreign county which
constitutes barriers to U.S. exports).
138. See Carter, supra note 136, at 1168 (citing W. Christopher, Diplomacy: The Neglected Imperative 1981:
Maynes, Logic, Bribes, and Threats,60 FORFIGN POL'Y 111 (1985)); see also Nara, supra note 95, at 229 (detailing
Section 301 prior to and after 1988).
139. See D. RosTENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIoNAL LAws ANS INTERNAMONAL COMMERcr.: THE

PROBLEM OFEXRTERM
RIALrrY 53 (1982) (noting that the Omnibus Trade And Competition Act of 1988 makes
significant changes in the Export Administration Act); see also Erick Hirschhorn & Joseph Tasker, Jr., Export
Controls: Toward A Rational System for Everyone Except Toshiba, With All Deliberate Speed, 20 LAW & Poucy
INT'L Bus. 369 (1989).
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enforcement tool, leading to limitations on exports to countries adhering to courses
of action inconsistent with U.S. policy."'14
As suggested in the abstract, the use of sanctions by the U.S. "assume[s] a
punitive nature by representing the penalty attached to transgression and breach of
international [and U.S.] law in the form of punitive actions initiated.., against one
or more states for violati[ons].'' Many countries often agree to stop their behavior
because to do otherwise would not be economically practical. 42 Obviously, the U.S.
holds an advantageous bargaining position because of its dominant position in the
world market. As a result, non-GATr members seeking "most favored nation" status
and even GATT members that are considered economically inferior to the U.S. may
succumb to threats for economic survival.
For example, "The United States warned Serbia... that unless it cooperates fully
in the prosecution of Serb officers and officials responsible for committing war
crimes in Bosnia, Washington will not vote in the U.N. Security Council to ease or
lift the SANCTIONS that have devastated Serbia's economy."' 43 Thus, the U.S.
influences, either through negotiation or coercion, the acts of other sovereigns. As
a result "[t]he U.S. use of threats of sanctions has led many of the countries to
acquiesce to U.S. demands; thus, retaliation [by other sovereigns] is infrequent."' 44
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the use of sanctions in the international community because many times sovereigns are expected to spend their time and money
to support, oftentimes, ill-conceived enforcement actions. "It is entirely possible that
sanctions could be effective in terms of breaking commercial relations, imposing
economic costs, and fulfilling a punitive role, yet be ultimately unsuccessful in
achieving their political objectives."' 45 Sovereigns are, therefore, reluctant to enforce
sanctions set forth by the U.S., either because they affect their economy or they are
do not agree with U.S. policy in the area.

140. Hirschhorn, et. al, supra note 139, at 369.
141. See Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and hternationalLaw: Reflections on the United
Nations' lperienceAgainst Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) (quoting M.S. DAOUDI & M.S. DAjANI, ECONOMIC
SANCIONS 8 (1983)); see also Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (validating U.S.
embargo of Mexican tuna as a result of application of the Marine Mammal Protection Act; Mexico violated the
"dolphin kill quota")
142. See William Booth, Embargo Leaves Haiti'sEconomy Down But Not Out, WASH. PosT, Aug. 10, 1994
at A14 (discussing the nearly total U.S. embargo-destroying Haiti's formal economy); see also Ann Devroy &
T.T. Reid, U.S. Awaits Word on N. Korea'sIntentions-PyongyangExtends Visas of Nuclear Inspectors, Sets Date
ForSummit with S. Korea, WASH. POST, June 22, 1994 at A15 (discussing shelving of international sanctions in
exchange for assurances to freeze nuclear program).
143. David B. Ottaway, U.S. Wanis Serbia on War Trials,WASH. POST, Jan 17, 1994 at AI9.
144. Sykes, supra note 135.
145. Christopher C. Joyner, The TransnationalBoycotts Economic Coercion in InternationalLaw: Policy,

Place and Practice, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 205-86 (1984).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL BLOCKING STATUTES

International cooperation and trade has taken on an expanded existence.
Developing countries arrived on the scene, developing nations and their subjects,
who are increasingly engaging in international business. The U.S. has been criticized
for its pervasive role in the extraterritorial application of its jurisdiction to cover
disputes beyond its borders. As a result of this U.S. aggressiveness, several countries,
including, but not limited to, Australia, Canada, Britain, and France, have considered
and passed retaliatory legislation, or "blocking statutes." These laws counter
sovereigns' efforts to extend jurisdiction beyond their borders and protect rights that
said country prescribes as inherent, e.g., Switzerland's banking and secrecy laws.
In an effort to suppress U.S. application of jurisdiction, the British government
passed several blocking statutes, Specifically, the United Kingdom Protection of
Trading Interest Act (PIT Act).4 The PTI Act was a direct response to decisions by
U.S. courts in several cases related to the uranium industry, Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Westinghouse147 Westinghouse was a complex combination of issues
resulting from antitrust related allegations in the uranium industry and request for
documents situated abroad.
The PTI Act's purpose is "to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions
and judgments imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United
Kingdom (UK) and affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the United
Kingdom.14 The Act gives the Secretary of State the discretion to prevent a company
from the UK from complying with the foreign decree. 49 This jurisdictional assertion
by a sovereign, (the U.S. in particular), is viewed as an encroachment on UK
sovereignty 50
Prior to the Protection of Trading Interest Act, Britain passed the Shipping
Contracts And Commercial Documents Act of 1964, which gave British shipowners
a "foreign compulsion" defense in U.S. courts. The Act allowed the shipowner,
charged with an offense in America, to assert that the action was based on British
law. The Act also provided that the Minister of Commerce could direct any person

146. The United Kingdom (UK) Protection of Trading Interest Act of 1980, ch 11, § 6(1)(c) [hereinafter PTI
Act]; see Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1984, ch. 49, § 1 (1984) (Can.); Thomas Murley, Compelling
Production of Documents in violation of Foreign Law: An Examination of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM
L. REv. 877, n.1 (1982) (citing several blocking statutes).
147. 429 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Va. 1977); see In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir.
1980) (concluding that conduct abroad ... intended to affect the uranium market in the U.S.... allegations fall
within the jurisdictional ambit... as defined in Alcoa); see also Snowden v. Connaught Lab. Inc., 138 F.R.D. 138,
141 (D. Kan. 1991) ("blocking statutes do not deprive... a [U.S.] court of the power to order ...produc[tion] even
though the act... may violate that statute"').
148. PTI Act, supra note 146, ch. 11 §§ 1-3 (improving UK defenses against attempts by other countries to
enforce their economic and commercial policies outside their own territories).
149. PTI Act, supra note 146, ch. 11, §§ 1-3.
150. PTI Act, supra note 146, ch. 11, §§ 1-3; see LAwRENcE CoLuINs, BLOCkING AND CLAWBACK
STATUTES: TmE UNITED KTNGDOM APPROACH COLLINS 452 (1986).
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in the United Kingdom to prohibit compliance with foreign measures if it infringed
on UK jurisdiction.' 1 As evinced by the enactment of blocking statutes, English
courts have often expressed their hostility to extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction
by U.S. courts.
The British court, in response to a U.S. citizen's attempt to apply U.S. patent law
to British subjects, held that it does not recognize American courts' orders which
would destroy or qualify those statutory rights belonging to an English national who
is not subject to American jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of the U.S. does not run in
England, and,
if due regard is had to the comity of nations, it will not seek to run in
52
England.1
53
The voluminous litigation resulting from In Re InsuranceAntitrust Litigation'
highlights the complex analysis a court must employ to balance U.S. interest with the
interest of another sovereign. In In Re Insurance Litigation,the Court considered the
Timberlane 11 analysis, the UK Blocking statute, comity and many other aspects of
international and domestic law. The Court, in reaching its decision, elaborated on the
confusion between comity and true conflict, which the Court said may dictate a nonapplication of U.S. law. The Court concluded that, on balance, enforcement of the
antitrust laws against activities in London's reinsurance market would lead to significant conflict with English law and policy. Following the Court's decision in
Timberlane 11, the Court decided that unless outweighed by other factors in the
comity analysis, the conflict in and of itself formed a sufficient reason to decline
jurisdiction; thus, the Court declined jurisdiction.
The French Blocking Statute, among other things, provides that "it is prohibited
for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing, orally or otherwise, economic,
commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading to
the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial proceeding. The parties
shall forthwith inform the competent minister if they receive any request concerning
such disclosure." ' 4 This statute is similar to the UK Blocking Statute and has also
been a source of contention in U.S. courts.
In 1987, the Court, giving little credence to the existence of the French Blocking
Statute, ordered the parties to make a good faith effort to obtain a waiver from the
French government so they could produce the requested documents. The Court said

151. PTI Act, supra note 146 (PTI Act repealed the Shipping And Commercial Documents Act of 1964.)
152. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1953] Ch. 19, [1952] 2 All ER 780
(Crt. App.).
153. In Re Ins. Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1989), reversed and remanded, In Re
Ins. Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedin partby Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 506 U.S. 814 (1992),judgment affid in part,rev'd in part, Hartford Fire Inc. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764,817 (1993); see Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982).
154. French Blocking Statute, Art 1A-2, French Penal Code Law No. 80-538.
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this action did not encroach on the French sovereign.'5 This request underscores the
U.S. desire to expand its jurisdictional reach. The statute was designed to curtail U.S.
expansion of jurisdiction by allowing the French to circumvent requests. None56
theless, the U.S. insisted on production of the requested documents.
Extended use of blocking statutes may continue if the U.S. continues to assert
jurisdiction beyond what one considers generally accepted principles of international
law. Further, the U.S. manipulation of certain agreements and obligations in order
to bring about its desired results is also an area of concern.
For example, in 1984,'5' the U.S. attempted to removed itself from the International Court's jurisdiction after Nicaragua filed a suit, Nicaragua v. United
States,5 8 against the U.S. as a result of U.S. actions in the Nicaraguan civil war. This
maneuver by the U.S. to avoid the International Court's (ICJ) jurisdiction sends the
wrong signal to the international community and exacerbates the perception that the
U.S. is a strong-arming nation that feels exempt from settled principles of international law. The U.S. is a member of the United Nations.'5 9 The U.S. has an
obligation to adhere to the ICJ because it is, ipso facto, within the ICJ's jurisdiction.
The ICJ, as a transnational tribunal, like GATT in the area of harmonized treaties,
could become the model adjudicatory body if it truly had compulsory jurisdiction,
with real enforcement mechanisms. Thus, if an authority existed that was vested with
the capacity to penalize the U.S. for contravening international law, then incidents
like the total disregard for other's laws and the blatant disregard for the ICJ's jurisdiction would cease. The authority to prescribe and enforce penalties would serve as
a deterrent, not only to the U.S. but to all others.
V. MULTILATERAL HARMONIZING TREATIES

Harmonizing treaties serve several purposes; they set uniform approaches to
legal problems and allow predictability. Even though many blocking statutes have
been adopted, the U.S. has participated in efforts to bring about predictability by
marshaling and agreeing to a great number of harmonizing treaties. On-the one hand,
the U.S. plays an integral part in this area; on the other hand, it has also criticized and
voiced skepticism about the attempts of others to harmonize certain areas. The
European Community has had its "critics, especially in the U.S. who have seen the

155. Compagnie Francasise d'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co. No. 81-4463,
Slip Op (S.D.N.Y. Jan 24, 1983); see Societe Nationale Industriele Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Cl., 482 U.S.
522 (1987); Rich v. Kis California, Inc. 121 F.R.D. 254 (1988).
156. See Thomas Murley, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination of The American Position, 50 FORDHAML. REv. 877 n.1 (1982) (citing several blocking statutes).
157. Preliminary ICJ Ruling on Nicaraguan Request, Department Statement, May 10, 1984, DEP'T. ST. BULL,
JUNE 1984, at 78-80.
158. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126.
159. GATIT, supra note 127.
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Convention as inhibiting harmonization, rather than securing it." 160 This argument
suggests that if the member states of the European Community agree upon uniform
choice of law rules, this will reduce the prospect of broader harmonization
through,
' 16
for example, the Hague Conference on Private International Law. '
This is not a correct argument. Regional and multilateral agreements are a source
of conflict for countries that are not a part of the agreement, non-signatories. If this
trend continues one may see a merger or combinations of mergers among the
bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements, which could ultimately merge into
a "Super Gatt" type of organization. The General Agreement on Tariffs And
Trade, 62 one of the most prevalent trade agreements, promulgated a gradual reduction in tariffs and an elimination of import quotas. Parties enjoy the "most
favored nation" status and several other provisions that allow countries to impose
sanctions against violators of GATT provisions. GATT governs international trade,
lowers tariffs, and eliminates many barriers to trade and regulates discriminatory
pricing practices.
When disputes arise, the Hague Evidence Convention'6 3 specifically sets forth
certain procedures that a judicial authority in one contracting state may request
evidence located in another. Specifically, [i]n civil or commercial matters a judicial
authority of a Contracting State may, in accordance with the provisions of the law of
that State, request the competent authority of another Contracting State, by means of
a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some other judicial act. The
expression "other judicial act" does not cover the service of judicial documents or the
issuance of judicial documents or the issuance of any process by which judgments
4
or orders are executed or enforced, or for provisional or protective measures.1
The Evidence Convention attempted to bridge the gap between civil and
common law practices for obtaining evidence abroad.'6 The problem with the Convention, as well as other treaties of this type, is the lack of "bite" or in other words,
mandatoriness. The Evidence Convention does not provide the exclusive, or even
preferred, method of obtaining discovery and documents in signatory nations.'6 For

160. PETmR NORTH, PRIVATH INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 136 (1993);

see Kurt H. Nadelmann, IJnpressionsismand Unificationof Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual and Non-contractual Obligations, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1976) (discussing the European
Economic Communities' attempt to harmonize private international law and the possibility that the attempt could
result in regional freezing of the law, rendering unification of law on a broader, international basis difficult, if not
impossible).
161. NORTH,supranote 160 at 136.
162. GATT, supra note 127.
163. 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 74444 (opened for signature March 18, 1970) (entered into force Oct. 6,

1974).
164. 23 U.S.T. 2555, art. I.
165. Philip Amram, U.S. Ratification of The Hague Convention on the Taking ofEvidence Abroad,67 AM.
J. INT'L L. 104 (1973) (discussing letters rogatory, the taking of evidence abroad, and international judicial
assistance).
166. Societe Nationale Industrielle Acrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522 (1987). See Snowden
v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 138 (D. Kan. 1991).
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example, in Rich v. Kis California Inc167 a U.S. citizen who purchased photo
processing equipment for a French manufacturer's American subsidiary sued the
French company, its French Chairman of the Board to compel discovery. The Court
said U.S. rules of civil procedure allowed discovery. "Defendants claim[ed] they are
168
prohibited from procuring the Evidence by virtue of the French Blocking Statute.',
The Court, using and agreeing with the analysis articulated in Societe National
Industrielle, said foreign litigants could not insist on producing evidence solely
through the Hague Evidence Convention, nor could they insist that such procedure
be the primary method for directing discovery requests. To make the determination,
the Court should consider the particular facts of each case, the sovereign interest
involved and whether resort to the Convention would be an effective discovery
device. 169 Ultimately, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery
from Kis France and Serge Crasninanski.' 70 Not only has evidence gathering caused
conflicts, but traditional U.S. service of process has also caused concerns in other
countries because the service rules seem to mirror the U.S. assertion of jurisdiction.
In other words, they are viewed as an intrusive extension of U.S. jurisdiction within
the territory of another sovereign.
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters17' (HCSA) was adopted by the U.S. even
though the conventional methods of process (registered mail and by adult non-party)
used by the U.S. are not set forth in the Convention. This adoption shows good faith
by the U.S. to harmonize. Unfortunately, U.S. Courts do not construe the Convention
as mandatory. The Court, in Kis held that the Convention did not provide exclusive
and mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located within
a foreign state, and first resort to the Hague Convention was not required because it
contained no plain statement of preemptive intent. The French government filed an
amicus brief stating that the Convention is exclusive, unless the sovereign decides
otherwise. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Convention did not deprive the
District Court of the jurisdiction it otherwise possessed to order a foreign national
72
party before it to produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation.
The Court also concluded that litigants do not have to first resort to Convention
procedures whenever discovery is sought from a foreign litigant. Article I states that
the Convention shall apply in all cases in civil or commercial matters, where there
is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. As
evinced here, the "shall" language has not been interpreted to mean mandatory.

167. 121 F.R.D. 254 (1988); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C.
1984).
168. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 256.
169. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 257.
170. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 263.
171. 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (Feb 10, 1969); see also Hague Convention on The Taking of
Evidence Abroad, 23 U.S.T. 255 (Mar. 18, 1970).
172. Societe Nationale Industriele Aerosptiele v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 528 (1987).
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The Court agreed that the Convention does not apply to discovery from a foreign
litigant subject to the jurisdiction of an American court. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure'73 also allow service of process upon individuals in a foreign country. The
rule recognizes the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial documents, but does not make it mandatory or primary. Failure to construe
the Convention as mandatory, obviously causes continual conflicts. This is due to
lack of predictability, which is one of the major contentions foreigners have with the
U.S. application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. If the Convention is not mandatory,
one never knows when it will be enforced. Nevertheless, the Convention is a starting
point, and it may evolve like the arbitration area.
The U.S. courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration clauses. Nonetheless, the
courts now recognize arbitration clauses in international contracts and increasingly
enforce arbitral awards. The Convention on the Recognition And Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards' 74 pertains to disputes in international commercial transactions stemming from disputes successfully arbitrated, but where the aggrieved
party now seeks to recover the award in a foreign forum. If parties draft an arbitration
clause into the contract, then it prevails and the courts should enforce the clause. 75
The Convention allows each signatory the right to refuse enforcement if enforcement
is contrary to public policy.' 76 Article III states that each contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them. 177 Arbitration provisions were
embraced by the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,178 where a German citizen,
Scherk, residing in Switzerland, to force defendants (ACC) to arbitrate their disputes
over licensing trademarks for toiletries.179 The Court said the U.S. Arbitration Act
reversed centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. It was designed to
enable parties to avoid the costliness and delays of litigation and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. The Court also reasoned that
national courts will need to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration.
Nevertheless, the arbitration area of international law, like the Hague Service
Convention, also encounters uncertainty in U.S. courts. A dispute over an arbitration
clause arose in MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. 80 Mitsubishi
sought and obtained an order to force the parties to arbitrate, as per the agreement.

173. FFD. R. CIv. P. 4(O(l)-(3) (1993).
174. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970); see U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. S 1 et. seq, P.L. 103-85,

(1993)
175. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507-8 (1974) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist
Seas., 1, 2 (1924) and Article V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520)).
176. See supranote 164 and accompanying text.
177. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970).
178. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-15 (holding that the provisions of
the Arbitration Act can not be ignored).
179. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-15.
180. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

1997/ United States Application Of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction

The Court required this representative of the American business community to honor
its bargain. In reaching its decision, the court reiterated Scherk's reasoning that U.S.
courts must subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to that of international
policy favoring arbitration. In LaSociete Nationale PourLa Recherche v. Shaheen
NaturalResources Co. Inc.' an Algerian Company and an Illinois Co. (Shaheen)
included an arbitration clause in their contract. The Court upheld the award and said
that to do otherwise would violate the goal and purpose of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, i.e., to expedite the
recognition and enforcement of awards.
The interesting point worth noting is the Court's reiteration of articles I and IX
of the Convention, which provide that the Convention applies to arbitral awards
made in the territory of a state other than the state where the recognition and enforcement of such award is sought.' This rule examines the situs of the contract and not
the nationality of the parties. This concept is similar to much of the analyses done by
U.S. courts, for example, disregarding nationality if contacts are present.
For domestic parties seeking to enforce arbitration clauses, the court does not
always enforce them.1 13 In Wilko v. Swan, the Court recognized the difficulty of
reconciling the Arbitration Act and the Securities Act. The Court, usifig general
principles of statutory interpretation and application, decided that the Securities Act
was more specific, and, thus, controlled.'t 4 The distinction here is the domestic
versus international posture of cases dealing with arbitration clauses. The analyses
and rulings in Scherk and Wilko underscore the U.S. amenability to harmonize
certain areas of the law. Specifically, in Scherk the Court articulated the frustration
that would result if the courts parochially refused to enforce intentional arbitration
agreements. 8 5 Moreover, the Court added that a contract provision specifying the
forum and law is almost an indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction. 8 6 Here,
the Court made a distinction between international and domestic issues, thus echoing
the need to decide certain international cases in the light of international law and U.S.
obligation under certain agreements. U.S. courts should not have the notion that U.S.
law must be applied first. One must strike a balance, and the courts should always

181. La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co, 585 F. Supp. 57,60 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983), affirmed La Societe National Pour La Recheche, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984).
182. Id.; see Bergesen v. Miller Corp. 710 F.2d 928,932 (2d. Cir. 1983).
183. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for
arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of Congress
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues
arising under the Securities Act).
184. Wilko, 346 U.S. at437-38 (holding that the Securities Act was enacted to protect the rights of investors
and has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights).
185. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (explaining that this would result in
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages).
186. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
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defer to the international application when the issues appear blatantly international
and touch the concerns of other sovereigns.
Another area of contention for the U.S. is within patent law. Developing
countries want to take advantage of new technologies but do not have the strict laws
that the U.S. employ to protect inventors' rights. Not only is the U.S. effort to protect
patent and copyrights linked to its desire to protect issues that affect U.S. commerce,
but also Congress has an explicit Constitutional mandate.18 7 The U.S. perception is
that copyright and patent protection in most places are inadequate to protect
American technology. The U.S. uses the earliest invention date (first-to-invent) as
opposed to the first-to-file-system used by most countries!"8 Thus, efforts to
harmonize this area are consistently a source of conflict.
The Hilmer Doctrine which allows U.S. patents to be used as prior art t8' is also
contrary to most systems. Many recent changes have been developed in patent laws
around the globe. Canada and the Philippines abandoned the "first-to-invent system,
thus leaving the U.S. as the only major power with the first-to-invent system.
Additionally, other nations are developing new patent laws with a focus on
harmonization."9
As a result of these changes, the U.S., for a change, may need to get on board
with the rest of the world and adjust certain laws to meet the prevalent international
standard, especially in the patent and copyright area. Like many of the areas
discussed, the most casual observer of international [copyright and patent] matters
would concede that rapid changes in 'state-of-the-art' technologies have made intellectual property negotiations an important part of any international discussion with
respect to trade, investment and development. For all of the progress that appears to
have been made the schism between developed and developing nations, as well as
between the United States and the members of the European Community and Asia,
promise that harmonizing in the IP area will be particularly difficult. ...
Therefore, the U.S. should acquiesce to the international standard.
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement'2 diminished trade restraints
between the U.S. and Canada and was the precursor to the North American Free

8.
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl.
188. See Gary Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, PriorUse Rights-A Necessary Partof a First-to-FileSystem,
26 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 567, 569 (1993) (describing first-to-file system as the system that virtually every other
country awards patents to the first person to file a patent application as the basis for priority decisions between
applicants).
189. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 861 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see Kate H. Murashige, The Hilmer Doctrine, SelfCollision,Novelty and the Definition of PriorAct, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 549, 549-52 (1993) (defining prior-act
as the time period before the effective filing date of the application in the first-to-file jurisdictions. In a first-toinvent jurisdiction (U.S.) prior refers to the time period preceding the moment when the invention was made).
190. See generally Alan S. Gutterman, InternationalIntellectual Property:A Sunmmary of Present Developments And Issues ForThe Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335 (1992).
191. Gutterman, supra note 190.
192. U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Implementation Agreement of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851
(1988).
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Trade Agreement. 193 The U.S.-Canada Agreement was also created as a result of
economic disagreements coupled with threats of countervailing duties and fear of
protectionism between the countries. NAFTA's objectives, inter alia, are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in and facilitate the cross-border movement of
goods and services between the territories of the parties; b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;... [and] f) establish a
framework for trilateral regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and
enhance the benefits of this agreement."9
Multilateral agreements are a necessary tool in the globalization process. Nevertheless, it may be unrealistic to believe that multilateral and regional agreements are
the answer to the jurisdiction query because they can be extremely cumbersome and
time consuming to negotiate.
Cooperation on an international rather than on a regional scale is a trend worth
expanding. Article 103(f) of NAFTA explicitly states the parties' desire to encompass multilateral endeavors in order to expand free trade. As different regions
enter into trade agreements and membership in GATT increases, the different
regional agreements may have to merge into multi-national agreements to survive
economically.
Further, agreements may be drafted using the GATT model (i.e., NAFTA).
GATT may have to expand by adopting a judicial branch or make the Intentional
Court of Justice the mandatory judicial entity for all international disputes, thus
relieving sovereigns of their authority to adjudicate international trade disputes.
Recently, the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations was signed,
15 April 1994; the U.S. is a party. This round established the "World Trade Organization."' 95 Two of its main purposes are to expand the production of, and trade in,
goods and services, and to administer the Understanding on Rules And Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Dispute (DSU).' 96
Development in "trade in services" has been a contentious area for the U.S.
Hence, the effectiveness of the DSU is worth tracking to see what trends develop in
the near future. Namely, will they produce more contention? Perhaps the major
powers will acquiesce to the DSU's authority, and as a result the DSU may become
the final (supreme) arbiter for international trade disputes, a supreme transnational
entity with enforcement power.

193. NAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1102.
194. NAFTA, supra note 125, art. 1103.
195. GATT: Multilateral Treaty Negotiations Final Act Embodying The Results of The Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125, 1140 (1994)
196. 33 I.L.M. at 1145.
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VI. EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
This paper emphasizes U.S. assertion of jurisdiction, but there are instances
when the U.S. declines jurisdiction. This restraint is due to respect for the laws of
other nations and specific U.S. laws geared to affording deference to other
sovereigns, by avoiding contentious assertions of jurisdiction, which may cause international ramifications.
For example, in Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo, A.B., t '9 the
court deferred to the Swedish courts based on comity, the presence of possible
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards issues, and specifically
because of the bankruptcy proceedings currently underway in Sweden concerning the
issue.'9 The court said the entire subject of enforcement is governed by the terms of
the arbitration clause because the Convention preempts state law. Victrix a
Panamanian corporation, and Salen, a Swedish corporation entered into a contract for
the charter of Victrix's ship. Salen filed for bankruptcy, and repudiated the contract.
Here, the bankruptcy issue weighed heavily on the Court's decision. The Court
vacated the order of attachment and deferred to the Swedish proceedings.'9 This
deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings is one of several tools employed by the
U.S. to restrain from asserting jurisdiction, especially when there is a possibility of
intruding on another sovereign's authority.
The doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens "refers to discretionary power of [a]
court to decline jurisdiction when convenience'of parties and ends of justice would
be better served if action were brought and tried in another forum."20° Forum Non
Conveniens is a very old doctrine that has been applied by U.S. courts for years,
without realizing what they were actually doing.201 The Forum Non Conveniens
doctrine requires the court to determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists
which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case. Next, the trial judge must consider
all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the balance a strong presumption
against disturbing a plaintiffs initial forum choice. If this balance of private interests
[is found] at or near equipoise, he must then determine whether or not factors of
public interest balance in favor of a trial in a foreign forum. If he decides that the
balance favors such a foreign forum, the trial judge must finally ensure that plaintiffs

197. Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Cargo, A.B., 825 F.2d 709,711 (2d Cir. 1987).
198. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 711 (holding that even though Victrix had arbitrationaward, the American courts
have long recognized the need to extend comity to bankruptcy proceedings-deference to Sweden serves U.S.
public policy).
199. Victrix, 825 F.2d at 716.
200. BLACKS LAwDICIONARY, 589 (5th ed. 1979); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (1948) (amended 1996); see also
Victri, 825 F.2d at 711 (holding that even though Victrix had an arbitrationaward, the American courts have long
recognized the need to extend comity to bankruptcy proceedings - deference to Sweden serves U.S. public policy).
201. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929);
see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (1948) (amended 1996).
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can reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or
prejudice." 2 2
This balancing is done to preserve U.S. foreign relations, policy interests, and
avoid encroaching on other sovereign's authority while ensuring that the party has
the opportunity to seek relief.
The Court dismissed a claim brought by thousands of Indian citizens and the
Indian government in an action arising out of an industrial disaster; methyl
isocyanate was released from a chemical plant by Union Carbide India Limited. °3
The Court clearly held jurisdiction, but dismissed on the basis of Forum Non
Conveniens, with special conditions.2 Likewise, a foreign seamen brought an action
against a vessel owner to recover for injuries resulting from alleged fraudulent labor
practices. The Court dismissed the claim under the doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens stating "it was necessary in light of the significant public and private
interest factors which weigh in favor of proceeding in the Philippines.2 0 5
As discussed above, the Act of State doctrine is often enforced and allows
foreign sovereigns to avoid jurisdiction in U.S. courts as long as their actions are
are dismissed for
sovereign acts. Many act of state and sovereign immunity issues
206
status.
sovereign's
the
of
results
a
is
which
jurisdiction,
lack of
Thus, when American citizens (a married couple) sued the government of Saudi
Arabia for tortious conduct based on failure to warn in an employment contract, the
Court dismissed the suit holding "that respondents' action alleging personal injury
resulting from unlawful detention and torture by the Saudi government is not based
upon a commercial activity within the meaning of the Act (FSIA), which consequently confers no jurisdiction over respondent's suit."2° The Court, in order to
reach this conclusion, adopted the district court's analysis, which outlined the lack
of a significant nexus between Nelson's recruitment and the injuries alleged. The
Court deduced that the connection between the injuries and the actions was far too

202. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Oy Wartsila A.B., 159 B.R. 984,990 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
203. In Re Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhophal, 634 F. Supp. 842 (1987).
204. Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 866-67 (order affirmed as modified by 809 F.2d 195 (1987) (finding that
courts of India have the capacity to mete out fair and equal justice; therefore, U.S. court deferred to courts of India
with the following special conditions: Union Carbide (UC) shall consent to jurisdiction of courts of India and shall
continue to waive defenses based on the statute of limitations; UC shall agree to satisfy any judgment rendered
against it by an Indian court; and shall be subject to discovery under the model of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure).
205. Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 359 (D. Ore. 1991); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (1946)
(amended 1993) (noting lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
206. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977) (precluding the court from inquiring about the
Libyan government's expropriations); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d. 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that Philippine bank where Government owned majority interest qualified as agency or instrumentality of foreign
state under FSIA).
207. Nelson v. Saudia Arabia, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993); see Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco), 892 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1990) (asserting that "Title VII does not reflect the necessary clear
expression of congressional intent to extend its reach beyond our borders").
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tenuous to support jurisdiction under the Act. °8 Sovereign Immunity is a doctrine of
international law under which domestic courts must refrain from asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state.2 9 Therefore, sovereigns enjoy quite a bit of predictability
in this area because of the presumption against extraterritoriality when a controversy
involves a sovereign or a U.S. domestic statute.
In another employment related case, the Court had to decide if Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act applied extraterritorially.210 Here, a naturalized U.S. citizen (born
in Lebanon) said that, while employed abroad by a U.S. company he was discriminated against because of his race, religion, and national origin. Justice Rehnquist held that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially. 2n EEOC failed to show
affirmative Congressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially and thus EEOC
did not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 2 2 Petitioner tried to
argue that the Alien Exempt Clause 213 was a manifestation of Congress' intent. The
Court unequivocally rejected this argument and said absent clearer Congressional
intent, it was unwilling to subscribe to imposing this country's employment2 discrimination regime upon foreign Corporations operating in foreign countries. 14
This articulation helps predictability in this area because of the Court's rejection
of an extraterritorial application of this Statute. Consequently, this rejection allows
foreign employers to know that they are not bound by this law, unlike the Sherman
Act which extends extraterritorially. If the court had ruled otherwise in this case, it
would have drastically extended U.S. law beyond all acceptable boundaries, such an
act would totally deviate from all customarily accepted international law.
The Court's analysis in ArabianAmerican Oil is similar to the Wilko analysis
because the Court clearly distinguished between domestic and international use of
the law. In some instances, U.S. courts are beginning to accept that deferring to other
sovereigns, even though jurisdiction may exist under U.S. law, is the correct
approach because the U.S. is part of the international community and must adhere
to the international standard when considering whether to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction.

208. Nelson, 113 S. CL at 1476.
209. International Assoc. of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (D.C. Cal.), affirmed 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (1979).
210. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
211. Arabian American Oil,499 U.S. at 250-51 (confinning that Congress must make a clear statement if
it intends for statutes to apply overseas).
212. ArabianAmerican Oil, 499 U.S. at 245.
213. ArabianAmerican Oil, 499 U.S. at 256 (Alien Exempt Clause expressly exempts employers with respect
to employment of aliens outside of any state).
214. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 245 (concluding that if Congress intended Title VII to apply
overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws, as it did in amending the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to apply abroad).
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This principle was articulated in American Banana2 5 in 1909 when the court said
that all legislation is prima facie territorial. More recently the Court held "that
Federal RICO [Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations] statutes may not
be applied to extraterritorial conduct alleged against the foreign defendants in light
of the presumption against such application and the insufficient nexus to U.S.
commerce when balanced against the interest of the Philippines."1 6 This presumption
has been effectively argued as evidenced by parties attempts to persuade, without
much success, the Court to extend other U.S. statutes extraterritorially.
In an era of increasing international commerce, parties who choose to engage in international transactions should know that when their foreign
operations lead to litigation, they cannot expect always to bring their foreign
opponents into a United States forum when every reasonable consideration
leads to conclusion that the site of the litigation should be elsewhere. 21 7 This
is particularly true if U.S. citizens expect to use U.S. laws that were not
explicitly intended to apply extraterritorially.
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S.desire to protect its citizens, its international policy, and its position as
a world power all contribute to the U.S. posture in this area. This paper reviewed the
U.S. approach to extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction, and, as a result, recognized
the uncertainty in the application of its laws and policy. Many countries oppose and
have taken measures against U.S. aggressiveness in this area; therefore, we may see
an increase in the use of blocking statutes if the U.S. does not reform its policy or
enter into additional multilateral treaties to provide additional harmony in this critical
area.
Several nations have been manipulated by U.S. threats of trade sanctions and
withdrawal of the "most favored nation" status. This action is similar to actions of
the U.S. against Mexico after the war. Unfortunately, the U.S. may suffer repercussions if it does not heed the warnings of the international community. International
law, though much is unwritten, has been developed as a result of customary international practice in certain areas, i.e., sovereigns refusal to encroach on another
sovereign's territory. As more developing countries become part of the international
arena, -international agreements bringing them into the power structure are going to
increase. One can never foresee all points of contention at the outset of an international agreement; nevertheless, agreements at least create a forum to address problems as they arise. In order to give the agreements more "bite," stringent penalties

215. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that U.S. jurisdiction may
extend to conduct in other nations, but here it did not have jurisdiction because there was no effect on U.S.).
216. Jose v. MfV Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 358 (D. Ore. 1991).
217. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Oy Wartsalia A.B., 159 B.R. 984, 1002 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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must be implemented, which can be enforced by an international tribunal (e.g., International Court of Justice), and established in the initial stages of trade negotiations.
This tribunal should have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to extraterritorial
matters.
The U.S., as a major leader, can play a pivotal role in the re-structuring of the
international community, but should proceed without employing a unilateral, somewhat strong-arm approach to solving international disputes. If foreign sovereigns
perceive U.S. action (jurisdiction) as fair and based on recognized or agreed to
principles and not instances of overreaching manifested by refusing to decline jurisdiction, then support can be garnered to harmonize the approach to solving disputes.
The practice of global deal making is always a matter of complying with or
avoiding a multiplicity of different countries' laws, rules, and policies, of weaving
between overlapping legislation and political decisions made by several governments. The problem of the legal and political squeeze is always on the minds of
international negotiations. 2 18
Thus, "[flor global deal makers, the final and perhaps ultimate challenge posed
by the law and politics of another country is that, at some point, their country may
be unfairly treated because it is foreign" 2 9 If this is truly a consensus, "the necessity
of the courts to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign
transnational tribunal," '2 must be employed with all deliberate speed. This deference
avoids the appearance of arbitrary extensions of U.S. law, because the U.S. is, of
course, not the world's supreme court. Ultimately, the major powers of the world
must submit to a higher transnational tribunal. According to the Austinian theory,
"only when an authority superior to the state is created with the power to enforce the
observance of international norms will international law be true law.",22 ' This theory
also asserts, "that law exists only when it emanates from a superior authority and can
be enforced by punitive sanctions."' 2 The U.S. has the ability to enforce its sanctions; therefore, I believe this is why it has successfully utilized this tool, sanctions,
as a major vehicle to influence U.S. policy abroad. The U.S. wields a big stick and
as a result the receiving country suffers adverse punitive effects, which can only be
avoided if a tribunal, with the requisite authority, is established to oversee international disputes.
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